Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

Friday, 1 February 2019

My Brontosaur Theory on Counterfactual Histories of Science


So called counterfactual histories are scenarios of what could have come to pass, if some contingent event of the past had turned out differently. It is controversial whether exploring such counterfactual alternative paths to the actual history has any merit for academic historiography. This is even more true for the history of science, because science is often assumed to approach one reality. Alternative paths in a counterfactual history must inevitably reach the same or a very similar state of knowledge, so the assumption.  

Therefore, historians of science usually claim that counterfactual narratives usually result in an alternative state of science that is pretty close or even identical to the actual state of science. This claim is supported by the assumption that a plausibility constraint prevents counterfactual histories from becoming incompatible with the actual science. That is, if a counterfactual history would end in a state of science that was incompatible with the actual science, then it would turn into science fiction and cease to belong to academic historiography. In other words: Counterfactual histories of science cannot be incompatible with the current state of science and be plausible at the same time!

Plausible counterfactual narratives that do end in identical or closely similar states of science are variously referred to as being contingent in a benign or weak sense (e.g., Soler 2008; Hesketh 2016; Tambolo 2018). One could think of this as two potential paths that departed at a contingent point of the past, but only one path got realized. If both had been realized, the gap between them would have remained rather thin and they would eventually have converged again. Think of the outline of a worm rather than a brontosaur. 

A popular example of a counterfactual narrative that has been taken to be benign or weak in this sense is Peter Bowler's Darwin Deleted (2013). It ends in an alternative state of science that is identical in its scientific content and only differs in its social context. In Darwin Deleted, Charles Darwin dies prematurely but, in the end, the resulting evolutionary theory is identical to the current one. The difference between the counterfactual and the actual science is that some social discontents (like social Darwinism, Nazi eugenics) got associated with alternatives to natural selection (e.g, Lamarckism, Spencerian ideas, orthogenesis) and sunk together with them. That is, they did not get associated with natural selection, which came in later. Therefore, natural selection came out clean in Bowler's counterfactual and Bowler's aim of his counterfactual was, in fact, to prove that there is no necessary association between natural selection and its social discontents.

I am not interested, here, in these social issues or Bowler's beef with the Intelligent Design proponent Weikart, who apparently wants to burden Darwin with some responsibility for the holocaust etc. Instead, I want to refute the above claimed necessary association between the plausibility of counterfactual histories of science and their compatibility with the actual science.

If this association was necessary, then any history of science (even one about actual not counterfactual research) would appear to be outlandishly improbable to us, because it went through states that are utterly incompatible with the current state of knowledge. Take Bowler's Darwin Deleted, for example. It is completely incompatible with the current state of evolutionary biology somewhere in the middle, because alternatives to natural selection like Lamarckism, use-inheritance, blending inheritance etc. rule there. At the same time, this intermediate state of science is not only plausible but grounded in what many actual scientists and philosophers did indeed believe for a long time after Darwin and before the Modern Synthesis. That is, even actual history confronts us with states of science that are incompatible with the current state and yet plausible to the highest possible degree.

In other words, the gap between the path of Bowler's counterfactual and the actual history of evolutionary biology is not worm shaped!

Hence my theory, which is mine, ahem ahem: The gaps between most counterfactual and actual histories of science are thin at the beginning, much, !much! thicker in the middle, and then thin again in the end. That is my Brontosaur Theory of counterfactual histories of science. It is mine and belongs to me and I own it and what it is too.


I have a second theory, which is the second part of my first theory and it is also mine. This is it: AHEM!!! By chopping brontosaur counterfactuals in half and truncating them, the gap between the counterfactual and the actual history will become cone shaped. That is, the gap will gape and never close again. I call this my Hyolith Theory on Counterfactual Histories of Science.

Reconstruction of Haplophrentis, a hyolith. From Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 3.0)

References
1. Bowler, P.J. 2013. Darwin deleted. Imagining a world without Darwin. The University of Chicago Press.
2. Hesketh, I. (2016). Counterfactuals and history: Contingency and convergence in histories of science and life. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 58, 41-48.
3. Soler, L. (2008). Revealing the analytical structure and some intrinsic major difficulties of the contingentist/inevitabilist issue. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39,
4. Tambolo, L. 2018. So close no matter how far: counterfactuals in history of science and the inevitability/contingency controversy. Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1787-7.

Sunday, 30 December 2018

A Punxsutawney Phil degree in history of science

This post is about how aspects of the movie Groundhog Day (with Bill Murray and Andie MacDowell) can be seen as a parable for a specific controversy in the history of science. But first I need to say a thing or two on that controversy.

The contingency-inevitability controversy is about the question whether the history of science would inevitably have had to lead to our current science, no matter what contingent path had been chosen in the past, or whether it could have lead to true alternatives, that is, sciences that are as successful as our current one but remarkable different in its theories, methods, machinery etc. [Some classical references: Hacking, Ian. 1999. The social construction of what? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hacking, Ian. 2000. How inevitable are the results of successful science? Philosophy of Science, 67, S58–S71. A more recent collection of works on that issue: Léna Soler, Emiliano Trizio & Andrew Pickering (Eds.). Science as it could have been. Pittsbugh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.]

The most often quoted statement in this controversy is from Hacking (2000, S61, original emphasis):

"Take any results R, which at present we take to be correct, of any successful science. We ask: If the results R of a scientific investigation are correct, would any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if successful, at least implicitly contain or imply the same results? If so, there is a significant sense in which the results are inevitable."

[I even quoted it myself in a paper once and refrained from pointing out the redundancy in "implicitly contain or imply" lest I'd be seen as a smart-ass or too stupid to sense an irony by Hacking. But a blog-post seems fair enough to indulge.]

The extreme positions on the contingency-inevitability continuum are: 
1. Extreme Contingentism: History of science is totally contingent. If scientists had taken an alternative turn at some point in the past, we would live with an entirely different science. It might not even be compatible with our current science yet be as successful (e.g., in statistics of healing sick patients).  
2. Extreme Inevitabilism: History of science is totally inevitable. No matter what alternative turn scientists might have taken in the past, we would live with exactly the same science as we have today.


Suppose the film-makers of Groundhog Day had been adherents of extreme contingentism. Then, Phil Connors (Bill Murray) could have planned nothing, because Butterfly Effects would have thwarted all his attempts to anticipate what will happen the next (same) day from what he experienced the previous (same) day. The boy would not always fall from the same tree, the man in the restaurant not always choke on a chunk of steak etc. Phil Connors should become mad by round 10 and the film-makers unable to tell a narrative. The film would be DaDa. 

Suppose, instead, the film-makers had been adherents of extreme inevitabilism. Then, Phil Connors could have changed nothing, no matter how hard he tried. All his attempts would be futile and the film would have no ending, just an open end telling us that it will go on and on forever.

Apparently, the film-makers chose an intermediate route, in order to be able to tell an interesting narrative. While Phil Connors is able to remember what had happened the previous (same) day and react differently, all others do not and behave just the same. In this way, Connors is a contingent factor (loose cannon at times) in an otherwise predictable world. Therefore, Phil Connors can work at trying to change his fate. If the rest of his microcosm was unpredictable or he had no power to change his own behavior and thereby tilt the microcosm towards another direction, then a film without a story would have resulted.

Interestingly, many historians of science think that authors who try to devise what-if scenarios of what might have come to pass, alternatively, (so-called counterfactual histories) are bound by similar narrative constraints. They can allow one or a very few factors of the past to deviate contingently, but the rest must remain predictable. Otherwise, their counterfactual history would become Dadaistic (everything contingent) or boring (everything determined) but either way have no merit for historiography.

P.S.: Of course there are other messages in the movie, like the one that love is a liberating force, but I was exclusively trying to explore analogies with a particular history-of-science issue.

Wednesday, 28 November 2018

The Comicreader’s Guide to the Historiography of Science

Abstract. This is neither a comic nor a piece of history or science. It is rather a meta-level comparison of two narrative formats—comic or graphic novel with historiography. The insights gained from this comparison are then applied to examples from the history of evolutionary theory, in order to show how the analogy can serve as a tool for visualizing particular narrative structures and functions.

Introduction
The explanatory role of narrative is a topical issue in philosophy and history of science (see Morgan and Wise 2017, and articles following in this special issue called Narrative in Science). In this quest, images are often used as analogies that can visualize narrative structures and their functions (e.g., Morgan 2017). John Lewis Gaddis, for example, begins his excellent book The Landscape of History with Caspar David Friedrich’s painting The Wanderer above a Sea of Fog (fig. 1). This summons up Gaddis’s own sense of what historical consciousness is all about. Historians focus their attention, from whatever vantage point they can find, on where they have been and turn their back on concerns of the present (Gaddis 2002, p. 2).

Fig. 1.: The Wanderer above the Sea of Fog by Caspar David Friedrich (around 1817). Hamburger Kunsthalle, Hamburg, Germany (picture taken by Elke Waldorf).

Soon, however, Gaddis needs to exchange this gazebo retrospective with other illustrative allegories and metaphors for the historian’s perspective. An eagle-eye (remote sensing) view can see what is happening in the valleys of the metaphorical landscape but will miss the action going on under canopies or roofs. Participant or protagonist reports can provide the latter, but will be limited to their individual experiences (see section 3, below).
    By chapter two, Gaddis’s metaphors are in disarray. A map is better than the eagle-eye view at conveying the idea that the landscape (history) is a representation that has been construed by someone. But he needs to depart from these static metaphors and to admit that historians can manipulate time, matter, and space in ways that neither a look-out, a map-reader, or a protagonist could. Historians can scale dimensions up and down by zooming in and out of situations. Zooming in, they can spy out particular events, like immaterial ghosts, without ever getting embroiled in the action (like time-travelers in movies). They can not only de-materialize themselves but also render the past scenery concrete or abstract. And they can retard and speed up the passage of time by jumping large swaths of time with a few sentences only to expand a crucial moment by treating it at a length that takes much longer to read or enact. That is, Gaddis needs to add allegories of dimension jumping, time traveling, and the like to the wanderer’s retrospective from a promontory.
   This suggested to me that comics may provide a more versatile analogy for historiographic narratives, even though the proposition may seem preposterous at first. It will seem less so after understanding the comic as a narrative format rather than a genre. Most people think of the comic or graphic novel as a genre and do associate it with either funny animals (e.g., Donald Duck) or superheroes. However, this is far from gauging the diversity of comics. Some are (auto-)bio-graphic novels (e.g., Bechdel 2007 on her family life, father’s suicide, and homosexual coming out; Dewilde 2016 on his surviving the terror attack on the Parisian night club Bataclan and finding back into life thereafter), some are journalistic war-zone reportages (e.g. Sacco 2009) or documentaries (e.g., Mandel and Bouagga 2017 on the refugees’ Jungle of Calais) and many deal with science in an instructional, educational, or edutainment form. Narratives of any genre can be put into the format of a comic or graphic novel. The format has been analyzed by McCloud (1994), Eisner (2001), Jüngst (2010) and many other comic makers and experts. All agree that it is a sequential art requiring a succession of still images. Whereas the story of a comic or graphic novel can be translated into many different media (e.g., film, audio play, text), the format is limited to media that can feature sequences of still images whether on paper, walls, or in digital media.
    The advantage of the comic over other narrative formats is that its structures and functions are rather obvious. They almost illustrate themselves. Therefore, the comic format is a good foil against which to compare narrative structures and functions in the history of science, which is a far more complex animal. Not each element, function, form of representation, or perspective in comics finds an analogon in the history of science but, in comparing these narrative formats, differences can be as informative as similarities.

1 The comic format
Comics and graphic novels will be obvious representations, even if they are documentary or biographic by genre. Therefore, the comic format has the advantage that nobody gets confused about the status of the narrative as a representation that has been constructed. This is not true for history writing, where their representational status needs emphasizing (Gaddis 2002).
    Comics are montages of both words and images (Eisner 2000, 8) where visual regimes (like perspective, symmetry, or resolution) are integrated with narrative ones (like grammar, syntax, plot). This is also true for pieces of history or science. Admittedly, the graphic character of comics dominates over the textual, whereas the reverse is true for history or science. The comic format is, nevertheless, closer to the history of science than purely graphic formats, like art canvas. The analogy between the comic and historiographic format is already closer than with others, before their texts are even written and their images even drawn.

1.1 Typical elements and their narrative functions
Figure 2 shows a prototypic comic strip with the usual elements being labelled in red. These elements are panels, gutters, captions, balloons, soundwords, and speedlines. The panels are snapshots of the story. They illustrate the narrative. The panels are separated by gutters. While these seem to be empty spaces, the readers need to construct the narrative from the snapshots by actively filling the void of the gutters with the help of their imagination. The readers have their minds in the gutters. The captions are explanatory comments that provide context. Balloons contain direct speech or thoughts of the protagonists. Soundwords evoke sound and speedlines evoke motion in the imagination of the readers.

Fig. 2: Typical elements of a comic (after Jüngst 2010, 14, red labels added).

1.2 Comparing the comic with the historiographic format
Comics and graphic novels lose their tension, when the information of the words simply duplicates that of the images. While this must be avoided in many genres put into the shape of a comic or graphic novel, such redundancy may be desired in educational or information comics. For example, in comics made for learning foreign languages images illustrate the meaning of words. Therefore, words and images represent the same things. Likewise, suspense is a desideratum in text-based thrillers and whodunits but not in scientific or historiographic writings.
    The comic panels (snapshots of the story) are analogous to pieces of the historical record. In history of science, these can be publications, data sets, pieces of correspondences, etc. The work of constructing a story from these snapshots is not left to the readers but provided by the author. This work is necessary for several reasons. First, the pieces of the historical record usually do not readily suggest a narrative by mere juxtaposition. Second, the pieces of the historical record are not necessarily snapshots of only one narrative. Sometimes they are too detailed and need to be stripped down, in order to represent a snapshot in the proposed narrative. Sometimes they are too meager and need to be augmented, in order to do so. And generally, they are very heterogeneous in media type and content. Some are texts, some diagrams, some data sets, some images, some theories, some methods, some instruments, some abstract, some concrete. Mere juxtaposition does not suggest a narrative. For these reasons, historians fill the spaces (gutters) between their record pieces with a lot of text that relates one piece to the next. Historians have their minds in the gutters.
    Balloons have their analogon in quotes and soundwords have a less direct analogon in metaphors and figurative speech. A soundword is an item of text that evokes a sound in the mind of the reader. Conversely, a metaphor or figure of speech is a piece of text that evokes an image in the mind of the reader. Historical narratives have no need for a special element evoking motion, like speedlines do in comics, because motion is simply described by words (e.g., ran, drove, speedily).
    What would happen, if a history comic transformed into a history book? The context providing captions would increase to pages of text. The gutters would expand even wider and fill with text forming whole chapters. The panels would shrink and attain various forms ranging from vintage images to vintage pieces of text. Soundwords would turn into metaphors and allegories and often migrate into the gutters. Speedlines would be replaced by words of motion and balloons by quotes of relevance. Text would thus invade the panels. Whenever authors conceived of producing their own illustrations of a historic situation or process, however, images would also invade the gutters. That way, the graphic novel would turn into a book of history as was well-nigh prerequisite, if the process was to count as a transformation of the comic into the historiographic format.

1.3 A difference that sheds a light on a philosophical issue
One unresolved issue of the history and philosophy of science concerns the relation of narrative and, respectively, scientific data or historical records (Morgan and Wise 2017). Does the narrative make (construe) sense of of the data and records, or does it discover their meaning? At first sight, the comic-format analogy seems to support the position that the images (analogous to data and records) imply the narrative, whereas the dominance of text in historical publications seems to support the opposite. Assume, however, a person with a brain damage of its narrative faculties. That person would neither be able to read the story from the images of a comic, no matter how narrow or absent the gutters, nor would it be able to get the narrative from the text of a history, no matter how detailed in prose and relieved of esoteric data and vintage records. Likewise, the significance of scientific data or historical records may often remain obscure without a narrative, but the narrative will remain an irrelevant fancy without data and records. That is, the difference between the dominance of images in comics and text in histories can be used instructively.

2 Graphic regimes in comics
2.1 Duration in comics (manipulating the time)
The space-time analogy is an inherent feature of sequential art (Eisner 2000, 25; McCloud 1994, 100). The sense for the passage of time works by associating spatial with temporal distance. Excluding literary tricks like flashbacks and so on, the chronology of images establishes a sense of time passing by. The comic reader connects images as though they were snapshots of a process in time. Just how much time passes from panel to panel is not determined by an external chronometer that ticks away independently of the narrative. It can be anything from a split second to an aeon. Again, the sequential art is closer to text-based narratives, where sentences can bridge various amounts of time, than non-sequential arts.

2.2 Forms of representation (transforming the matter)
Comics can represent something in a concrete, abstract, or metaphorical form. The form of representation can switch from one panel to the next and different forms of representation can even be interlaced within one panel. Figure 3 shows a page from a science-comic featuring all three forms of representation. The top panel even interlaces concrete with abstract representations. By abstract I do not mean the abstraction of iconic from real images as in the middle panel (fig. 3, the figure of Barak Obama). Such icons still represent things that eyes could see in reality. The arrows in the top panel of figure 3, however, represent scientific conceptions that are not visible to the eye. Here, the arrow coming in from the sun represents electromagnetic waves in the range of visible light. The arrows that go out from the earth and bounce back from the outer atmosphere, however, represent a mixture of things: electromagnetic waves in the infrared range (that is, heat waves) are partly reflected back to earth, but their energy is also absorbed by molecules and converted into the kinetic energy of these molecules. As kinetic energy of molecules it can no longer escape into space. That the visual representation of the greenhouse effect is incomplete, however, is irrelevant to the current point that comics can visualize abstract concepts of science.

Fig. 3: From The Great Transformation. The top panel interlaces concrete and abstract representations as well as tele- and macroscopic perspectives. The bottom panel is a metaphorical representation (after Hamann et al. 2014, 19, red explanations added).

2.3 Perspectives (jumping the dimensions of scale)
Comics jump dimensions of scale easily. For example, one panel may show a remote (telescopic) perspective on a situation and the next a macro-, micro- or even submicroscopic perspective. While this jumping of dimensions of scale usually occurs between panels, the different perspectives can also be interlaced within one panel. As already seen in the previous section, the top panel of figure 3 interlaces an abstract representation of the greenhouse effect with a concrete, though iconic, representation of Hans Joachim Schellnhuber. But is also interlaces a telescopic with a macroscopic perspective. Such jumps between and interlacing of perspectives also occurs in other forms of narrative. They are even necessary in order to overcome a rock-paper-scissors like dilemma of single perspectives in historiography (see following section 3).

3 A rock-paper-scissors dilemma of single perspectives
3.1 The gazebo retrospective
Gaddis (2002) opened his book with a gazebo perspective and suggested that it could represent the perspective of historians focusing on the past and firmly turning their back on present concerns. However, it may as well represent a limited perspective, where the author has an elevated point of view but does not see the goings-on in the valleys of the landscape. Abridged accounts, as can often be found in educational rather than historical or scientific publications, lead from a presumed past to a fancied present by connecting the landmarks of a research history in a straight line. They do not check whether the nether regions of that history support the straight narrative. Take the online lesson Key Events in the History of Biological Study by Meredith Mikell (2018) at the online learning platform Study.com. It states:
“Around the same time, British naturalist Charles Darwin proposed his theory of evolution by natural selection in his work, On The Origin of Species, following his famous voyage on the HMS Beagle to the Galapagos Islands. He was not the first or only scientist to suggest evolution as the cause of biodiversity; Alfred Wallace had independently also proposed that evolution occurs as descent with modification. The theories of Darwin and Wallace were highly controversial at the time, but establishing the concept of evolution is considered to be the single most important contribution to the study of biology. These concepts were furthered by the works of Gregor Mendel on inheritance, for which he was considered the father of genetics.” (Mikell 2018)
The next paragraph jumps to the molecular structure of DNA and credits Rosalind Franklin with the discovery of the double helix rather than James Watson and Francis Crick. Leaving the factual errors aside, this is an abridgement connecting landmark publications in a straight line without any regard of the contorted historical paths in between. Figure 4 (left) illustrates this, by allegory, with a path that seems to pass over three hilltops in a roughly straight line. One problem with the abridged gazebo account of Mikell (2018) is that the Mendelians turned against the Darwinians and proposed mutation as the ultimate source of variation instead of Darwin’s conditions of existence or Weismann’s sexual reproduction (Stoltzfus and Cable 2014). From an eagle-eye perspective (fig. 4, right), the street turns out to be curvy and loop back on itself at times.

Fig. 4: Path over hills. Left: gazebo perspective. Right: Map-reader's view. Circles represent hills.

3.2 Remote perspectives
The eagle-eye perspective has its own shortcomings. In our landscape analogy, the eagle does not see what goes on under canopies and roofs. The peers of a field might seem to move coherently into the same direction, when a closer surveillance would record significant disagreements among them. Unless such disagreements boil over into overt controversies, they often get glossed over in statements made from an eagle-eye perspective, in order to give an overview or introduce to the general topic. It is a small step from there to historical oblivion.
   For example, such amicable disagreements were important for the advance of theory on the evolutionary significance of sexual reproduction in the 1970s. Here is the context. In the late 1960s, evolutionary biologists took a U-turn that transformed sexual reproduction from the default mode of reproduction into an anomaly and, conversely, turned asexual reproduction into the expected but anomalously rare default mode. Weismann (1889, chap. 5) had rejected the conditions of existence as the ultimate source of heritable variation. Since he needed such a source of heritable variation, lest natural selection grind to a halt, he seized sexual reproduction as that source instead. Fisher (1930) and Muller (1932) in turn replaced it by mutation as the ultimate source of heritable variation, but they kept sexual reproduction as a mode of speeding up the population-wide process of adaptation. This implied a benefit of sex for groups, like populations or species, which got explicitly rejected in the late 1960s. Without this group benefit of sex, however, the ubiquity of sexual reproduction among animals and plants turned into an anomaly.
   The pioneers George Williams, John Maynard Smith, and Bill Hamilton were not mental triplings. They disagreed on fundamental issues like the cost of sexual reproduction or the relevance of parasites for its evolutionary maintenance. In particular, Williams (1975) conceived the cost of sex as the cost of reducing the relatedness, r, of parents to their offspring from 1 to 0.5, whereas Maynard Smith (1978) conceived it as the cost of males that contribute nothing (except sperm) to reproduction. Williams’s cost occurs in all sexual reproduction, whereas Maynard Smith’s is absent from species where gametes are of equal size or both parents care equally for the offspring.
   Likewise, Hamilton’s model assumptions disagreed with Williams’s. Hamilton modeled the differential effect of pathogens and parasites, that can quickly adapt to overcome their host’s defences, on asexual mutants in species with otherwise obligate sexual reproduction (e.g., Hamilton et al. 1990). Williams (2000) challenged the applicability of these red-queen models to organisms with a complex life-cycle of the strawberry-coral type. They produce (philopatric) offspring that stays close to its parents (and its parents’ pathogens and parasites) as well as dispersing offspring that gets away from the parents. However, the philopatric offspring is clonal and the dispersing offspring recombinant. If fast adapting parasites were the selective pressure keeping sexual reproduction beneficial, organisms with this life-cycle should do the opposite (see Dagg 2016; 2017 for details on these disagreements).
   Accounts of such amicable but important disagreements are more likely to be gotten from the reports of participants (e.g., Trivers 2010; 2015, 195) or, vicariously, through preserved pieces of correspondence (see Dagg 2016), biographical notices, etc. Lumping these pioneers together on issues they disagreed about is unhelpful historically though not necessarily in other respects:
“It is important to realize that the ‘cost of sex’ [meaning Maynard Smith’s cost of males] and the ‘cost of meiosis’ [meaning Williams’s cost of reducing relatedness] are not different concepts.” (Bell 1982, 63)
“George Williams, whose evolutionary ideas have always seemed convergent like those of a twin or older brother from whom I was parted at birth.” (Hamilton 1996, 354)
“Anisogamy leads to a cost of sex, whether the gamete types are produced by the same individual (hermaphroditism) or by different reproductive morphs (males and females) of the same population (Maynard Smith 1971a, 1978; Williams 1975; Bell 1982).” (Jokela et al. 2009, S43)
The first quote is factually wrong, the second states a sentiment rather than a fact, and the third is a simplification lumping three scholars together (in parenthesis).

3.3 The protagonist’s or participant’s report
Gaddis (2002, 4) mentions early on that the participants in a story usually lack an expanded horizon beyond their immediate experience, unless they can find some lookout point. This leads us back to the need of a gazebo and to a rock-paper-scissors like dilemma in historiography. Each perspective has its advantages over the antecedent and its disadvantage over the subsequent.
   The participant’s account of Robert Trivers (2010; 2015, 195), for example, relates how George Williams challenged one of Bill Hamilton’s theories during a memorial session for the deceased Hamilton.
“George got up and said, “I wish Bill were here today, because I have a bone to pick with him.” He then proceeded to pick that bone for the entire talk. It had to do with the evolution of sex and patterns of evidence that George had pointed out years ago that contradicted (so George said) aspects of Bill’s parasite approach. I thought it was wonderful. There were those who said that his talk was inappropriate, and why didn’t he just tell stories. But I thought it was perfect for the occasion. Both vintage George Williams – no wasted motion with that organism! – and a tribute to the enduring importance of Bill’s ideas.” (Trivers 2015, 195)
This account leaves the reader clueless as to what the disagreement of Williams with Hamilton was actually about. It lacks some lookout point from which to see the antecedent theories of Hamilton (red-queen model) and Williams (strawberry-coral model) as well. Fortunately, Williams (2000) managed to put his challenge on record (see previous section) in what seems to have been one of his last attempts at doing science before he drifted off into Alzheimer’s. Unfortunately, it has been utterly ignored—possibly—because it occurred in an obituary rather than a regular scientific article.
In conclusion, one perspective is not sufficient for historiography. Therefore, the comic format seems to be a better analogy for what is required.

4 Applying the analogy to examples
4.1 The Song of the Dodo
David Quammen’s The Song of the Dodo (Quammen 2012) belongs to the genre of popular science writing. And its concerns are not purely historical but also the environmental crisis and species extinction. But it contains enough history of science and literary craftsmanship to illustrate some narrative analoga to the comic format.
   Quammen (2012, chap. 1) begins with describing the cutting of a Persian carpet into pieces as a metaphor for habitat fragmentation, unraveling of ecosystems, and species extinction. The comic-format analogon to metaphor is a soundword like:


Chapter 2 opens with cases of species and sub-species that used to live on particular islands, like Madagascar, Bali, or Lombok, but are now extinct (Quammen 2012, 17f). These concrete examples are narrated from a map-reader’s perspective. These mementos of the environmental crisis serve to fetch readers with contemporary environmental concerns where they stand and lead them on to a history of science journey. That journey begins with a gazebo retrospective (p. 18f) that enumerates some landmarks of island biogeography: Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, Alfred Wallace’s Island Life, Joseph Hooker’s publications on the botany of New Zealand, and The Theory of Island Biogeography (MacArthur and Edward Wilson 1967). Quammen does not molest his readers with this abstract theory itself, but they do get a hunch that such a theory exists.
   Quammen (2012, 19f) continues with some biographic information about Alfred Wallace and Charles Darwin. Before the biography style can put lay-readers off, however, he launches into full participation by interlacing the story of Wallace’s journey in the Malay Archipelago with accounts of his own journey on the tracks of Wallace. By this clever move, Quammen is able to tell the stations of Wallace’s journey from the participant’s perspective. Pieces of Wallace’s historical record get sprinkled into the personal experiences of Quammen or vice verse.
   Thus, before he even launched the story of Alfred Wallace in the Malay Archipelago, Quammen has run an impressive gamut of narrative ploys. He has jumped perspectives from map-reader’s view over gazebo retrospective to participant’s report. He has varied his forms of representation from metaphoric to concrete and even left a hint at the existence of an abstract theory. And he has interlaced the past with the present.

4.2 Dispelling the Darkness
While John van Wyhe’s Dispelling the Darkness (2013) also deals with Alfred Wallace, it is an entirely different animal from Quammen’s Dodo. Whye begins his narrative with an account of how Alfred Wallace conceived his idea of species transmutation through natural selection while suffering a fit of tropical fever on the island Ternate. That is, he begins with a biographic protagonist’s perspective. His chapter 8, however, can serve to illustrate the narrative analogon of zooming in from a telescopic to a macroscopic scale and simultaneously retarding the passage of time to slow-motion. In this chapter, Wyhe addresses the plagiarism-claim that Wallace’s famous Ternate essay, which galvanised Darwin into writing up his theory, must have reached Darwin earlier than the latter admitted. For this, Wyhe manipulates the dimensions of scale and time.
   The chapter begins with describing the island of Ternate (featuring several vintage maps), continues with describing Wallace’s house (featuring a floor map of Wallace’s house and a photography of a similar house). Wyhe reviews previous theories about these happenings (gazebo retrospective), before he zooms in to human life-size and decelerates, in order to dissect the happenings of February 1858. He takes on the hat of a ship-company’s clerk, who details the time-tables of departures and arrivals, as well as the hat of an archivist, who matches Wallace’s notebook entries with these time-tables.
   It is not my job, here, to judge the correctness of Wyhe’s conclusions. His chapter stands exemplary for many scholars who have studied the time-tables of potential ships for the Ternate essay in minute detail. In the current context, it illustrates the narrative strategies of jumping dimensions of scale and manipulating the passage of time in history of science writings.

5 Conclusion
I started by suggesting that the comic format is a particularly versatile analogy for historiography. Limiting the use of analogy in history to this one would, nevertheless, constrain authors unduly. If one wished to enrich one’s prose with a diverse oeuvre of metaphors, figures of speech, paintings etc. such a constraint would indeed be gagging. I do not propose to limit the use of analogy in historiography but, figuratively, try to open a new window to fruitful analogizing. I have no other aim, here, or conclusion. A long quote from The Landscape of History indicates that John Lewis Gaddis would have appreciated the use of such a versatile analogy and the fresh air that the young sequential art would have brought to historiographical considerations.
“I fear that this chapter has staggered, even more than the others, under the weight of the metaphors I’ve inflicted on it […]. I make no apologies for metaphors, however, mixed or otherwise. […] For it seems to me that empathy – whether with respect to the past, the present, or the future – absolutely requires them. If we’re to be open to impressions, which is what I’ve argued empathy means, we’ve also got to be comparative. And that, in turn, is just another way of saying that something is “like” something else. […] If metaphors help us think – if, to use yet a final one, they can open windows and let in fresh air – then we have every reason to rely on them, and to do so unashamedly. We need all the help we can get.” (Gaddis 2002, 128)
If the comic analogy is a solution to a problem that John Gaddis never had, then that will be due to the fact that he is an accomplished history writer. The above sections showed, nevertheless, that differences in the comic and historiographic format can be used instructively (section 1.3) and that similarities can be used to to gauge the narrative craftsmanship of a history writer (section 4). This analogy may well turn out to be a useful lamp for seeing structures and functions in historiographic narratives via comparing them with the graphic techniques of comics. If the comic analogy helps any student to decipher or compose a history of science, this article will have served its purpose.

References
Bechdel, Alison. 2006. Fun Home: A Family Tragicomic. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Bell, Graham. 1982. The Masterpiece of Nature: The Evolution and Genetics of Sexuality. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Dagg, Joachim. 2016. On Recognising the Paradox of Sex. Philosophy & Theory in Biology 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ptb.6959004.0008.003.
Dagg, Joachim L. 2017. How Counterfactuals of Red-Queen Theory Shed Light on Science and Its Historiography. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 64, 53–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2017.06.001.
Dewilde, Fred. 2016. Mon Bataclan : Vivre encore. Paris: Lemieux Editeur.
Eisner, Will. 2000. Comics & Sequential Art. Expanded Ed. Paramus, NJ: North Light Books.
Fisher, Sir Ronald Aylmer. 1930. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Gaddis, John Lewis. 2002. The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hamann, Alexandra, Claudia Zea-Schmidt, and Reinhold Leinfelder. 2014. The Great Transformation. Climate – Can We Beat the Heat? Comic. Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen.
Hamilton, W. D. 1996. Narrow Roads of Gene Land. Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hamilton, W. D., R. Axelrod, and R. Tanese. 1990. Sexual Reproduction as an Adaptation to Resist Parasites (a Review). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 87.9, 3566–73.
Jokela, Jukka, Mark F. Dybdahl, and Curtis M. Lively. 2009. The maintenance of sex, clonal dynamics, and host-parasite coevolution in a mixed population of sexual and asexual snails. The American Naturalist, 174(S1), S43-S53. https://doi.org/10.1086/599080.
Jüngst, Heike Elisabeth. 2010. Information Comics: Knowledge Transfer in a Popular Format. Peter Lang.
MacArthur, Robert H., and Edward O. Wilson. 1967. The Theory of Island Biogeography. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mandel, Lisa, and Yasmine Bouagga. 2017. Les nouvelles de la jungle (de Calais). Turnai, BE: Casterman.
Maynard Smith, John. 1978. The Evolution of Sex. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCloud, Scott. 1994. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art. Reprint. New York: William Morrow Paperbacks.
Mikell, Meredith. 2018. Key Events in the History of Biological Study. Study.Com. http://study.com/academy/lesson/key-events-in-the-history-of-biological-study.html. Accessed 19 Nov. 2018 [archived at: https://archive.is/x27wb].
Morgan, Mary S. 2017. Narrative Ordering and Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 62, 86–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.006.
Morgan, Mary S., and M. Norton Wise. 2017. Narrative Science and Narrative Knowing. Introduction to Special Issue on Narrative Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 62, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.005.
Muller, Hermann J. 1932. Some Genetic Aspects of Sex. The American Naturalist 66 (703), 118–38. https://doi.org/10.1086/280418.
Quammen, David. 2012. The Song Of The Dodo: Island Biogeography in an Age of Extinctions. Random House.
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Stoltzfus, Arlin, and Kele Cable. 2014. Mendelian-Mutationism: The Forgotten Evolutionary Synthesis’. Journal of the History of Biology 47.4, 501–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10739-014-9383-2.
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Wyhe, John van. 2013. Dispelling The Darkness: Voyage In The Malay Archipelago And The Discovery Of Evolution By Wallace And Darwin. World Scientific.

Tuesday, 13 November 2018

Motives and merits of counterfactual histories of science

A preprint of my new article is here. The published version is in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2018.11.001. A free entry for 50 days (from 16.02.2019) onward is here: https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1YaC34tTwyIZAH.

In the article, I propose a simple way for distinguishing construed from genuine contingencies—the so-called temponaut's test. Suppose the historian in question travelles back in time and, inadvertently, puts his counterfactual history into action. Here's an illustration (that is not in the published article) of the temponaut's test applied to a construed contingency. 😜


Thursday, 11 February 2016

Genuinely new ideas in ecology and evolution

Dynamic Ecology had a guest post about novelty recently and the comments air the opinion that there's truly nothing new under the sun. For some reason my comments no longer get through there, so here are some examples of ideas that were genuinely new when first published:

1. Autumn lef colours are warning signals to herbivorous insects. (Hamilton and Brown 2001.












Thursday, 23 April 2015

Lamarck's analogy/homology of nature with culture (1809)

[For information on further anticipators visit: Natural Selection before Darwin and Wallace.] 


Types of comparison
Biologists distinguish analogous traits from homologous traits. Analogous traits are similar, because of convergent adaptation towards similar environmental conditions. An analysis of the fine structures of these traits, however, will show differences proving that they have been derived from different ancestral traits. The similarity is only superficial. The eyes of vertebrates and octopuses often serve as an example of analogous traits. Although they look extremely similar, superficially, analysing the fine structure reveals, for example, that the innervation of the retina is inverse in vertebrates, but not in octopuses.  
      Homologous traits can look similar or different, depending on the similarity or difference in environmental conditions to which they have been adapted. An analysis of their fine structure, however, will show identities proving that they have been derived from the same ancestral trait. The standard example for homologous traits are the limbs of vertebrates. Although they can look as different (divergent) as the wings of bats and birds or the legs of horses and humans, the fine structure (of bones, tendons, muscles) reveals that they have been derived from the same ancestral limb.
     With this distinction, we can categorise comparisons as follows. If a comparison highlights differences in effects but does not compare the underlying causes, it will be a superficial contrast. If it highlights similarities in effects but does not compare the underlying causes, it will be a superficial analogy. If it highlights similarities in effects but also shows that these are due to the different underlying causes, it will be a deep analogy. Finally, if effects are similar or divergent, but the underlying causal machineries are identical, it will be a homology.

Categories of comparisons

superficial analogy deep analogy superficial
contrast
homology

effects

similar


similar


different

similar
or divergent

causes

--

different


--


identic
"--" means that the causal relations are not being compared.

Lamarck's homology
As shown in the previous post, Charles Naudin proposed that natural and artificial selection were not only superficially similar (analogous) in their effects, but also that this similarity was due to homologous causes. Alfred Wallace and Charles Darwin had not yet published and Matthew (1831. On Naval Timber and Arboriculture) had proposed a difference and conflict in the effects of of natural and artificial selection and did not explicitly compare the causal machineries of both processes (see taxonomy of comparisons below). Matthew's proposal was either a superficial contrast or an implied homology with divergent effects. That is, even as a homology, it was different from Naudin's homology of causes with similar effects. Therefore, Matthew (1831) is an unlikely source of inspiration for Naudin's proposal. But Lamarck (1809. Philosophie Zoologique) explicitly proposed a similarity of the effects of nature and culture due to homologous causes.

Ironically, the first English translation of Lamarck's Zoological Philosophy that is digitised and available online (via Archive.org, but not via books.google) is that of Hugh Elliot from 1914. Therefore, books.google will generally fail to identify Lamarck as a possible source of inspiration for English literature. 

For simplicity (and sparing the reader the pleasure of my translations from French into English), I will quote from the translation of Elliot. As Lamarck did not publish later editions of his Philosopie Zoologique that could have differed from his first, taking Elliot's translation is just as well as translating from the French would have been. 

The homology between nature and culture is at page 109 of Elliot's translation. The passage begins with a Buffonism:     
"Those who have observed much and studied large collections, have acquired the conviction that according as changes occur in environment, situation, climate, food, habits of life, etc., corresponding changes in the animals likewise occur in size shape, proportions of the parts, colour, consistency, swiftness and skill.
What nature does in the course of long periods we do every day when we suddenly change the environment in which some species of living plant is situated."
The original passage is at page 225-26 of Lamarck (1809, vol. 1):
"Ceux qui ont beaucoup observé, et qui ont consulté les grandes collections, ont pu se convaincre qu'à mesure que les circonstances d'habitation, d'exposition, de climat, de nourriture, d'habitude de vivre, etc., viennent à changer; les caractères de taille, de forme, de proportion entre les parties, de couleur, de consistance, d'agilité et d'industrie pour les animaux, changent proportionnellement.
Ce que la nature fait avec beaucoup de temps, nous le faisons tous les jours, en changeant nous-mêmes subitement, par rapport à un végétal vivant, les circonstances dans lesquelles lui et tous les individus de son espèce se rencontroient."

Conclusion
In contrast to later comparisons of natural with artificial selection, Lamarck had use-inheritance in place of selection. Charles Naudin merely recombined the strong homology claim already present in French science with the also already present idea of selection (see previous post).

Saturday, 7 February 2015

David Hull on priority & impact

Here are some quotes from philosopher of science David Hull showing that he distinguishes between priority and impact of a publication and credits Darwin's On the Origin of Species for its impact not its priority. In particular, Hull (1990) argues that the anticipators of natural selection, like Matthew (1831. On Naval Timber and Arboriculture) caused no revolution (for whatever reasons) and that it is therefore being called the Darwinian revolution and not, say, the Matthewian one.
     The low impact of Matthew's book is evident from the fact that nothing much happened for 28 years. Admittedly, some scholars reviewed and cited it, most importantly Loudon (1832. "Matthew Patrick On Naval Timber and Arboriculture with Critical Notes on Authors who have recently treated the Subject of Planting." Gardener’s Magazine. Vol. VIII. p.703), because he had not only read the book but, unlike others (e.g., Chambers), also received the message about natural selection as a cause for species transformation in it. But, apart from this limited impact, neither public debate nor scientific revolution ensued. Even in 1858, after the documents of Darwin and Wallace had been read before the Linnean Society of London, nothing much happened. The paradigm shift only occurred after the publication of the Origin of Species in 1859.
     That is, we can do justice to both by crediting Matthew's priority in formulating the idea that natural selection may cause a transformation of species, and crediting Darwin's impact in causing a scientific revolution with this. 
"According to the conventional mores of science, one scientist can work twenty years developing a theory; another may spend only a couple of weeks on his theory. If the second scientist publishes first, the officially this scientist is supposed to receive all the credit for the contribution. Of course, the system does not always work this way. For example, Darwin is endlessly castigated for not behaving more honorably toward Wallace. What he actually should have done upon receiving Wallace's paper was to write to Wallace asking permission to have it published, wait the year necessary for Wallace to receive the letter and for Wallace's reply to get back to England, and then publish Wallace's paper. After that, he could properly publish his own work.
I find this scenario of proper scientific etiquette absurd in the extreme, but even if Darwin had been foolish enough to behave so irresponsibly, the subsequent history of Darwinism would have been little altered. Darwin still would have received most of the credit. But, one might justifiably object, historians are not supposed to be able to reach such contrary-to-fact conclusions. In this case, however, the conclusion is unexceptional because, after Darwin and Wallace published, an obscure author established priority over both men. In 1831 Patrick Matthew (1790 - 1874) had published a clear statement of natural selection in an appendix to a book on naval timber and arboriculture. If Wallace deserved priority over Darwin because of his 1858 paper, then Matthew surely deserved priority over both men because of his 1831 paper. All sorts of reasons can be given for ignoring Matthew's claim to priority for natural selection: he published his views in an out-of-the-way place, he did not develop them in sufficient detail, he did not continue to develop his theory in later publications, and so on. The problem with these excuses is that they apply to numerous unappreciated precursors to whom we have awarded retrospective credit." (David Hull 1990. "Science as a Process." P. 51)
Later, however, Hull (1998) added strategic reasons in priority disputes in trying to answer the question why we speak of Mendelian genetics, although Mendel's historical position has been similar to the one of Patrick Matthew. In particular, he attributes the cause in the junior re-discoverers (Correns and Tschermak) preventing any attempt by anybody to attach de Vries's name to the new genetics, by referring to it as Mendelian instead.  
"What counts as a "new scientific truth?" How "new" must it be? To answer these questions, [End Page 213] I turn to two examples of scientific revolutions: the Darwinian revolution and the Mendelian revolution. Inevitably, when scientists publish what they take to be new scientific ideas, historians will find all sorts of precursors. For example, Matthew (1831) anticipated Darwin with respect to natural selection, and numerous authors, including Lamarck and Robert Chambers, anticipated him with respect to evolution. Why then term the revolution that took off in 1859 the Darwinian revolution? Why not the Matthewian revolution? The answer is that Matthew did not produce a revolution of any kind. His allusions to what came to be known later as "natural selection" went totally unnoticed at the time. Authors such as Lamarck and Chambers had some impact with respect to the transmutation of species (e.g., on Wallace), but neither succeeded in producing anything like a "revolution." Darwin did.
The Mendelian revolution poses a different set of problems. Was Mendel the author of the Mendelian revolution or was he simply a precursor like Matthew, Lamarck, and Chambers? Although Mendel's 1865 paper did not go totally unnoticed, it certainly did not initiate anything like a revolution in the study of heredity. The Mendelian revolution did not occur until the turn of the century when others came up with views similar (though far from identical) to those of Mendel. These authors claimed independent discovery. If so, then Mendel's paper played no role in the "rediscovery" of Mendelian genetics. Then why call this revolution "Mendelian?" One answer is that Mendel's paper includes a careful and clear exposition of the theory that eventually came to bear his name. It was not just a vague sketch. Another reason is that it served to stave off a priority dispute. The two junior rediscoverers were not about to have this theory named after them. They were able to sabotage any potential effort by the powerful de Vries to get his name attached to this emerging field by emphasizing the role of Mendel. Better Mendelian genetics than de Vriessian genetics." (David Hull 1998. Studying the study of science scientifically. Perspectives on Science 6(3): 209-231)
This would suggests that Alfred Wallace, Darwin's co-(re-)discoverer of natural selection, could have sabotaged any potential effort to call the theory in question Darwinian, if he would have wanted. What Wallace has done, however, was the opposite. He has titled one of his books "Darwinism" and has done so in 1889, long after he had learned about Matthew's anticipation.

While plagiarism theorists will surely construe this as evidence for Wallace's (and Darwin's) guilt in plagiarising Matthew (1831), I prefer to think that Wallace was simply fine with the term "Darwinism" being attached to the theory.

In accordance with my previous post, I suggest to allow no cheap excuses and crediting Matthew (1831) with priority full stop. I also suggest to credit the impact of a work as equally if not more important than priority for the historic development of a science. Darwin would have gotten most of the impact-credit, historically, simply because it was his book that had a major impact on natural history/biology and not Matthew's. However, the credits given in the history of genetics would need to be re-apportioned. 

Related posts

Friday, 24 October 2014

False alternatives in creationism and Darwin-plagiarism-theories

A curious similarity exists between creationists and ID-ologists on the one hand and Darwin-conspiracy theorists on the other. The former are unable or unwilling to consider the gradual evolution of organisms or traits from predecessors. The latter are equally unable or unwilling to consider the gradual evolution of Darwinian ideas from predecessors. 

The creationists and ID-ologists claim that it is impossible for complex organisms or traits to evolve by mere chance. Their examples are something like the impossibility of an airplane assembling from a storm in a junkyard or the ostensible irreducibility of complex traits. The Darwin-conspiracy theorists claim the impossibility that the full blown theory of evolution by means of natural selection precipitated independently and from scratch in the minds of Matthew, Wallace and Darwin around the same time. They, too, ignore the predecessors and assume an impossible event that was not necessary for the outcome.

Their false alternatives have no bite
What both have in common is the logic fallacy of false alternatives. Either emergence through mere coincidence or creation, these are the false alternatives of creationists. Either independent discovery from scratch or plagiarism, these are the false alternatives of Darwin-conspiracy theorists.

Where the former see the whole of nature as a big conspiracy pointing towards a creator, the latter see the convergence of ideas as a conspiracy of Darwinists against Wallace, Matthew, or Blyth alternatively.

If we consider the predecessors, however, it is clear that natural selection was not a yet undiscovered idea. On the contrary, it existed in many different contexts (see here, here, here, here and here). Ironically, before Matthew (1831), natural selection was thought to keep the species fixed. We'd now say, they only considered stabilising selection and failed to see the possibility of directional selection.

T.R. Malthus (WikimediaCommons)
In particular, Matthew, Wallace and Darwin all admitted that Thomas R. Malthus (1798. An Essay on the Principle of Population ) was a major source of inspiration for their insight into the importance of natural selection.

Let's see, then, whether anything in Malthus's essay comes so close, that we can comprehend the independent emergence of the idea of evolution through natural selection. (Six times between 1813 and 1858 by Wells 1813/1818, Adams 1814, Matthew 1831, Spencer 1852, Wallace 1858 and Darwin 1858.)

Malthus (1798, p. 11) starts from two simple postulates:
"I think I may fairly make two postulata.
First, That food is necessary to the existence of man.
Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state."
From these postulates he deduces a law of nature (Malthus 1798, p. 13f):
"Assuming then my postulata as granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will shew the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.
By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal.
And he illustrates the effect of that law of nature (Malthus 1798, p. 15):
"The race of plants and the race of animals shrink under this great restrictive law. And the race of man cannot, by any efforts of reason, escape from it. Among plants and animals its effects are waste of seed, sickness, and premature death. Among mankind, misery and vice."
Malthus's law of nature can justly be called by its current name, which is natural selection. The only thing that is still missing, is the idea of heritable variation acting in concert with this natural selection. That a lot of variation is heritable, however, was a triviality for plant and animal breeders of all stripes. Is it then not comprehensible, how various scholars independently combined these explanatory parts into similar or even identical theories of evolution through natural selection?